As of January 1, 2025, the over-65s number about 14.5 million, or 24.7% of the population; they were 24.3% a year earlier, signaling a structural and continuous aging process. The over-80s number about 4.6 million (4,591,000), up about 50,000 from 2024, and represent an increasing share within the elderly population itself.
For the first time, the over-80s outnumber children under 10 (about 4.3 million), marking a “demographic overtaking” that reverses the demographic pyramid from just twenty years ago. Twenty-five years ago there were about 2.5 children for every 80-plus year old, while fifty years ago the ratio was about 9 to 1; today it is reversed, with more older adults than young children.
The number of ultracentenarians reaches an all-time high of more than 23,500, symbolizing high longevity but also very intense care needs.
The working-age population (1564 years old) drops to about 63.4%, while those under 15 years old stop around 11.9%, with an increasingly weak generational replacement.
By 2024, there are about 370,000 births, with the fertility rate falling to 1.18 children per woman, an all-time low and well below the replacement threshold.
Deaths in 2024 are about 651,000: the natural balance is strongly negative (about -281,000), and the population dynamic is kept partly in balance only by migration flows.
Italy remains among the longest-living countries: life expectancy at birth rises to about 81.4 years for men and 85.5 for women, gaining nearly five months in a year. Demographic forecasts indicate a declining population: from about 59 million to just under 58.6 million in 2030 and to about 54.8 million in 2050, with concomitant growth in the share of the elderly.
By 2050 the over-65s could reach about 3435% of the population, while the ratio of working-age people to inactive people would drop toward 1 to 1, severely compressing the contribution bases. Aging is intertwined with social frailties: loneliness and risk of poverty in old age are increasing, with wide territorial gaps in access to social, health and care services.
The central information for public policy is the combination of three factors: strong growth in the share of the elderly, decline in the working population, and plummeting birth rate; together they produce a rapid deterioration in the relationship between taxpayers and beneficiaries of the pension, health and local welfare systems.
The “overtaking” of the over-80s over the under-10s shifts the center of gravity of service demand toward longterm care: home care, residential care, social and health integration, housing and mobility adaptation become strategic, not “ancillary,” social infrastructure.
The most obvious contradiction is that while the number of elderly (and particularly the frail elderly) grows, local public spending on dedicated services falls or remains insufficient and very uneven territorially; this opens up space but also responsibilities for the third sector, social cooperatives and private operators in co-designing structured responses with the PA.
From a medium-term perspective, ISTAT data indicate the need for an integrated strategy on at least four axes: revitalization of the birth rate and work-life balance; attraction and integration of migrants of active age; enhancement of care for the non-self-sufficient elderly (home, semi-residential, community); and rethinking of welfare financing models (more prevention, more territory, more social and health integration).
